EU — 3124th Council meeting Foreign Affairs — Horn of Africa and Somalia

Brus­sels, 14 Novem­ber 2011
The Coun­cil debat­ed the sit­u­a­tion in the Horn of Africa and in Soma­lia.
The Coun­cil adopt­ed a strate­gic frame­work for the Horn of Africa, which is to guide EU action for greater peace, sta­bil­i­ty, secu­ri­ty, pros­per­i­ty and account­able gov­ern­ment in the region. The strate­gic frame­work sets out five areas for EU action: Build­ing robust and account­able polit­i­cal struc­tures; con­tribut­ing to con­flict res­o­lu­tion and pre­ven­tion; mit­i­gat­ing secu­ri­ty threats ema­nat­ing from the region; pro­mot­ing eco­nom­ic growth, and sup­port­ing region­al eco­nom­ic coop­er­a­tion. – Horn of Africa
The Coun­cil adopt­ed the fol­low­ing con­clu­sions on the Horn of Africa:

1. “Under­lin­ing the impor­tance attached by the EU to its rela­tions with the Horn of Africa, the Coun­cil has adopt­ed today a Strate­gic Frame­work to guide the EU’s engage­ment in the region. It wel­comes the High Representative’s pro­pos­al to appoint an EU Spe­cial Rep­re­sen­ta­tive (EUSR) for the Horn of Africa, focus­ing in the first instance on Soma­lia, the region­al dimen­sion of the con­flict and pira­cy, and looks for­ward to the devel­op­ment of action plans to sup­port imple­men­ta­tion of the Strate­gic Frame­work.

2. The EU’s long-term com­mit­ment to the Horn of Africa is root­ed in the region’s geo-strate­gic impor­tance, the EU’s desire to sup­port the wel­fare of the peo­ple of the Horn and to help lift them from pover­ty into self-sus­tain­ing eco­nom­ic growth. Insta­bil­i­ty in the region pos­es a grow­ing chal­lenge not only to the secu­ri­ty of its peo­ples but also to the rest of the world. Con­tin­ued EU engage­ment will be in sup­port of both region­al efforts, includ­ing through the Inter-Gov­ern­men­tal Author­i­ty for Devel­op­ment (IGAD) and the African Union (AU), and nation­al efforts to achieve last­ing peace, secu­ri­ty and jus­tice, good gov­er­nance based on the demo­c­ra­t­ic prin­ci­ples of inclu­sion, the rule of law and respect for human rights. The Strate­gic Frame­work also recog­nis­es the need to pro­tect Euro­pean cit­i­zens from the threats that emanate from some parts of the region, includ­ing ter­ror­ism, pira­cy and the pro­lif­er­a­tion of the arms. It also iden­ti­fies a num­ber of com­mon chal­lenges such as cli­mate change and migra­tion.

3. The EU remains deeply con­cerned about the human­i­tar­i­an cri­sis affect­ing sev­er­al coun­tries in the Horn of Africa. Build­ing on exist­ing sup­port pro­vid­ed to date (over € 760 mil­lion), the EU will con­tin­ue to pro­vide neu­tral, impar­tial and inde­pen­dent human­i­tar­i­an assis­tance to vul­ner­a­ble pop­u­la­tions and calls for increased assis­tance from and coor­di­na­tion of all donors. The Coun­cil calls on all par­ties to ensure safe and unhin­dered access by human­i­tar­i­an actors in accor­dance with inter­na­tion­al human­i­tar­i­an prin­ci­ples.

4. The Coun­cil high­lights the need to address the under­ly­ing caus­es of the cur­rent human­i­tar­i­an cri­sis in par­tic­u­lar struc­tur­al food inse­cu­ri­ty, recur­rent drought and con­flict. The EU will con­tin­ue to sup­port the coun­tries of the region in strength­en­ing their nation­al capac­i­ties through dis­as­ter risk reduc­tion strate­gies and long-term devel­op­ment coop­er­a­tion pro­grammes in the areas of drought-pre­pared­ness, agri­cul­ture, rur­al devel­op­ment and food secu­ri­ty. The effec­tive­ness of such sup­port is, how­ev­er, depen­dent upon local own­er­ship and the polit­i­cal com­mit­ment of the coun­tries of the region to put struc­tur­al poli­cies in place to sup­port sus­tain­able agri­cul­tur­al and live­stock pro­duc­tion, includ­ing cross-bor­der move­ments, nat­ur­al resource man­age­ment, in par­tic­u­lar water resources, as well as trade and region­al inte­gra­tion.

5. Pira­cy off the coast of Soma­lia con­tin­ues to neg­a­tive­ly impact on inter­na­tion­al mar­itime secu­ri­ty and region­al and inter­na­tion­al eco­nom­ic activ­i­ties. The Coun­cil remains com­mit­ted to the com­mend­able work of the EU naval counter-pira­cy oper­a­tion, EUNAVFOR Ata­lan­ta, which pro­vides pro­tec­tion to World Food Pro­gramme and AMISOM ship­ping, and con­tributes to deter­ring pira­cy and pro­tect­ing vul­ner­a­ble ship­ping. The EU will advance work to enhance the capac­i­ty of Soma­lia and the wider Horn of Africa region to fight pira­cy, includ­ing through fur­ther strength­en­ing of mar­itime capac­i­ties as well as pros­e­cu­tion and deten­tion capac­i­ties. The EU will con­tin­ue to work towards the track­ing of finan­cial flows from pira­cy. The EUSR for the Horn of Africa will con­tribute to devel­op­ing and imple­ment­ing a coher­ent, effec­tive and bal­anced EU approach to pira­cy, encom­pass­ing all strands of EU action.

6. The Strate­gic Frame­work, in Annex, sets out the way in which the EU will pur­sue its strate­gic approach, work­ing in part­ner­ship with the region itself and key inter­na­tion­al part­ners.


Exec­u­tive Sum­ma­ry
The polit­i­cal evo­lu­tion of the Horn of Africa over the past 50 years has been unusu­al­ly tur­bu­lent. The objec­tive of the Euro­pean Union is there­fore to sup­port the peo­ple of the region in achiev­ing greater peace, sta­bil­i­ty, secu­ri­ty, pros­per­i­ty and account­able gov­ern­ment.

The EU’s engage­ment in the Horn will be sup­port­ive of a region­al and coun­try-lev­el envi­ron­ment con­ducive to peace, secu­ri­ty and jus­tice, of good gov­er­nance based on the demo­c­ra­t­ic prin­ci­ples of inclu­sion, the rule of law and respect for human rights, and of socio-eco­nom­ic devel­op­ment based on the attain­ment of the Mil­len­ni­um Devel­op­ment Goals (MDGs) with due con­sid­er­a­tion to equi­ty, cli­mate change and sus­tain­able liveli­hoods.

The EU’s inter­ests in the Horn of Africa are defined by the region’s geo-strate­gic impor­tance, the EU’s his­toric engage­ment with the coun­tries of the region, its desire to sup­port the wel­fare of the peo­ple and help lift them from pover­ty into self-sus­tain­ing eco­nom­ic growth, and the need for the EU to pro­tect its own cit­i­zens from the threats that emanate from some parts of the region and address com­mon chal­lenges.

To achieve its objec­tive of peace, sta­bil­i­ty, secu­ri­ty, pros­per­i­ty and account­able gov­ern­ment, the EU will

(1) Assist all coun­tries in the region to build robust and account­able polit­i­cal struc­tures, includ­ing civ­il and civic insti­tu­tions, allow­ing the peo­ple of the Horn to express their legit­i­mate polit­i­cal aspi­ra­tions and ensure that their basic human rights and free­doms are respect­ed;
(2) Work with the coun­tries of the region and with inter­na­tion­al organ­i­sa­tions (espe­cial­ly the Unit­ed Nations and African Union) to resolve cur­rent con­flicts, par­tic­u­lar­ly in Soma­lia and Sudan, and avoid future poten­tial con­flicts between or with­in coun­tries;
(3) Ensure that, until that is achieved, the inse­cu­ri­ty in the region does not threat­en the secu­ri­ty of oth­ers beyond its bor­ders, e.g. through pira­cy, ter­ror­ism or irreg­u­lar migra­tion;
(4) Sup­port efforts to pro­mote the eco­nom­ic growth of all coun­tries and peo­ple in the region, to enable them to reduce pover­ty, increase pros­per­i­ty and enjoy not suf­fer from the ben­e­fits glob­al­i­sa­tion can bring;
(5) Sup­port polit­i­cal and eco­nom­ic region­al coop­er­a­tion and bol­ster the role of the Region­al Eco­nom­ic Com­mu­ni­ties (RECs) to tap into pos­i­tive trends and devel­op­ments across nation­al bor­ders;

To enhance the coher­ence, qual­i­ty, impact and vis­i­bil­i­ty of the EU’s mul­ti­fac­eted action in the region, an EU Spe­cial Rep­re­sen­ta­tive (EUSR), in close con­sul­ta­tion with the EUSR for Sudan and South Sudan, will con­tribute to the EU’s region­al approach to the inter­re­lat­ed chal­lenges fac­ing the Horn.

The Frame­work pro­pos­es a num­ber of ways the EU can pur­sue this strate­gic approach that will enable it to do so in part­ner­ship with the region itself and key part­ners. It iden­ti­fies areas for action, but spe­cif­ic actions, in the form of sub-strate­gies and action plans, will be sub­ject to sub­se­quent deci­sions by the Com­mis­sion, Coun­cil and Mem­ber States.

The High Rep­re­sen­ta­tive and the Euro­pean Exter­nal Action Ser­vice (EEAS), the EUSR, EU Del­e­ga­tions in the region, the Euro­pean Com­mis­sion and Mem­ber States will work togeth­er to imple­ment this Frame­work.”

– Soma­lia
The Coun­cil adopt­ed the fol­low­ing con­clu­sions on Soma­lia:

1. “The EU remains con­cerned about the sit­u­a­tion in Soma­lia and its region­al impli­ca­tions and is active­ly engaged in alle­vi­at­ing the con­se­quences of the wors­en­ing human­i­tar­i­an sit­u­a­tion, restor­ing secu­ri­ty and con­tribut­ing to peace, devel­op­ment and inter­nal rec­on­cil­i­a­tion in the coun­try. The famine has expand­ed to six regions of south­ern Soma­lia, includ­ing Mogadishu, and threat­ens to fur­ther expand across the south affect­ing near­ly half of the pop­u­la­tion. The EU appeals to all con­cerned that inter­na­tion­al human­i­tar­i­an actors should be giv­en free and safe access to all in need of assis­tance. The EU will con­tin­ue to pro­vide human­i­tar­i­an assis­tance to the most vul­ner­a­ble pop­u­la­tion and encour­ages oth­ers to do so.

2. The EU con­demns the con­tin­ued attacks on Soma­li civil­ians by Al Shabaab, includ­ing the bomb attacks of 4 and 18 Octo­ber in Mogadishu. It is par­tic­u­lar­ly con­cerned about the exten­sion of such attacks to neigh­bour­ing coun­tries, includ­ing Kenya, and the kid­nap of Euro­pean cit­i­zens and calls for their imme­di­ate release. Such attacks threat­en not just neigh­bour­ing coun­tries but the inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty as a whole. The EU sup­ports efforts to counter the threat of such attacks, con­sis­tent with inter­na­tion­al law; in this respect the EU reminds all par­ties of their oblig­a­tions to pro­tect civil­ians and safe­guard human­i­tar­i­an access in full accor­dance with inter­na­tion­al human­i­tar­i­an prin­ci­ples. Recall­ing that mil­i­tary action alone will not cre­ate last­ing secu­ri­ty in Soma­lia, the EU under­lines the need for coor­di­na­tion of all mil­i­tary and secu­ri­ty actions in Soma­lia with the Tran­si­tion­al Fed­er­al Gov­ern­ment (TFG), the Inter-Gov­ern­men­tal Agency for Devel­op­ment (IGAD), the African Union (AU) and the Unit­ed Nations (UN) to ensure that mil­i­tary action against Al Shabaab is con­sol­i­dat­ed in the con­text of a sound civ­il and polit­i­cal strat­e­gy able to ensure a sus­tain­able peace.

3. The EU reaf­firms its com­mit­ment to con­tin­ue polit­i­cal and finan­cial sup­port for AMISOM and encour­ages AU efforts to secure addi­tion­al donors. It prais­es the com­mit­ment and brav­ery of the AMISOM peace­keep­ing troops who, togeth­er with the secu­ri­ty forces of the TFG, have paid a high price to help build secu­ri­ty in Mogadishu. The EU encour­ages AMISOM and the TFG forces to con­tin­ue their efforts to pre­vent civil­ian casu­al­ties and to fur­ther devel­op their capac­i­ties to pro­tect civil­ians and their human rights. The EU under­lines that its sup­port must be matched by com­ple­men­tary polit­i­cal efforts by the TFG, includ­ing ini­tia­tives to demon­strate peace div­i­dends to peo­ple in safe, freed areas of the Soma­li cap­i­tal.

4. Con­sis­tent with its com­mit­ment to assist the devel­op­ment of the Soma­li secu­ri­ty sec­tor, the EU has recent­ly decid­ed to extend the EU train­ing mis­sion (EUTM Soma­lia) for the pro­vi­sion of mil­i­tary train­ing to the Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Forces (NSF) of Soma­lia, with a spe­cial empha­sis on the strength­en­ing of the chain of com­mand and self-train­ing capac­i­ties of the NSF. The man­date will be car­ried out in coop­er­a­tion with the TFG, Ugan­da, AMISOM, the US and oth­ers. The EU com­mends the efforts and com­mit­ment of the first intake of trained Soma­li sol­diers in the recent secu­ri­ty devel­op­ments in Mogadishu.

5. The EU wel­comes the out­come of the con­sul­ta­tive meet­ing held in Mogadishu from 4 to 6 Sep­tem­ber, where key Soma­li lead­ers includ­ing rep­re­sen­ta­tives of the Tran­si­tion­al Fed­er­al Insti­tu­tions (TFIs), of the regions of Punt­land and Gal­mudug, as well as of the Ahlu Sun­na Wal Jama’a group signed togeth­er a “Roadmap for End­ing the Tran­si­tion”.

6. The EU will con­tin­ue to par­tic­i­pate active­ly in the Tech­ni­cal Com­mit­tee estab­lished to mon­i­tor progress on the Roadmap and reit­er­ates that the pace and degree of such progress will deter­mine the extent of con­tin­ued or addi­tion­al EU sup­port to the TFIs.

7. Recall­ing the rec­om­men­da­tions of the Inter­na­tion­al Con­tact Group meet­ing on Soma­lia in Copen­hagen, 29–30 Sep­tem­ber, the EU appeals to all sig­na­to­ries of the Roadmap to imple­ment the agreed tasks empha­sis­ing: a viable con­sti­tu­tion­al process, a sus­tained attempt at rec­on­cil­i­a­tion; effec­tive par­lia­men­tary reform, the devel­op­ment and imple­men­ta­tion of a Nation­al Secu­ri­ty and Sta­bil­i­sa­tion Plan as well as am effec­tive mar­itime secu­ri­ty and counter pira­cy pol­i­cy. The EU rec­og­nizes that these tasks are inter­de­pen­dent and it is com­mit­ted to pro­vide tar­get­ed sup­port for their full imple­men­ta­tion, pro­vid­ed the TFIs demon­strate the polit­i­cal will to deliv­er effec­tive­ly, improve finan­cial trans­paren­cy and account­abil­i­ty, and take effec­tive action to tack­le cor­rup­tion. The EU is con­cerned about the pace at which the Roadmap is being imple­ment­ed and urges the TFIs to imme­di­ate­ly imple­ment the pri­or­i­ty tran­si­tion­al tasks.

8. The EU stress­es, in par­tic­u­lar, the impor­tance of a cred­i­ble and inclu­sive con­sti­tu­tion­al con­sul­ta­tion process lead­ing to a con­sti­tu­tion­al frame­work being in place by the end of the tran­si­tion peri­od, i.e. August 2012. The suc­cess­ful con­clu­sion of the polit­i­cal tran­si­tion process will require full, trans­par­ent and broad-based Soma­li own­er­ship. The EU notes the poten­tial chal­lenges in involv­ing an increas­ing num­ber of inter­nal­ly dis­placed per­sons in the con­sul­ta­tion process. In this con­text, the EU encour­ages the Tran­si­tion­al Fed­er­al Gov­ern­ment (TFG) to pur­sue a process of out­reach and rec­on­cil­i­a­tion with local and region­al actors, civ­il soci­ety includ­ing women, reli­gious and com­mu­ni­ty lead­ers as well as oth­er groups who are will­ing to engage con­struc­tive­ly in the process to return the rule of law and con­sti­tu­tion­al gov­ern­ment to Soma­lia.

9. In addi­tion the EU calls on the TFG to do all it can to com­bat ter­ror­ism and com­mits to sup­port the TFG in these efforts.

10. Already the largest donor to Soma­lia, the EU is increas­ing its devel­op­ment assis­tance to cen­tral, region­al and local actors to con­sol­i­date a civil­ian strat­e­gy to build sta­ble and account­able gov­er­nance, improved liveli­hood oppor­tu­ni­ties and the pro­vi­sion of basic ser­vices. Regions of Soma­lia such as Punt­land, Soma­liland, as well as oth­er local actors, includ­ing Ahlu Sun­na Wal Jama’a, will be fur­ther sup­port­ed by the EU as long as they con­tin­ue to make progress in pro­vid­ing ser­vices, enhanc­ing the Soma­li rec­on­cil­i­a­tion process, com­bat­ing Al Shabaab and devel­op­ing their coop­er­a­tion with the TFIs and oth­er region­al actors. The EU will ensure that its efforts in these regions are coor­di­nat­ed with oth­er inter­na­tion­al actors.

11. The EU also under­lines the need for a com­pre­hen­sive approach to address pira­cy, includ­ing through capac­i­ty build­ing in the mar­itime, judi­cial and pen­i­ten­tiary sec­tors, with a spe­cial empha­sis on Soma­lia. To this end, it encour­ages the strength­en­ing of coop­er­a­tion between the TFG and the regions of Punt­land, Gal­mudug and Soma­liland.

12. The EU calls for fur­ther efforts to stream­line and strength­en the coor­di­na­tion of all actors and inter­na­tion­al donors to Soma­lia. The estab­lish­ment of the pro­posed Joint TFG-Donor Finan­cial Man­age­ment Board needs urgent atten­tion.

13. The Coun­cil con­sid­ers a sus­tained pres­ence in Mogadishu will facil­i­tate sup­port to the Soma­li peace process, and invites the HR and the Euro­pean Com­mis­sion to exam­ine how this may be assured in ways com­pat­i­ble with the secu­ri­ty sit­u­a­tion.”

1 For the pur­pose of this paper, the Horn of Africa is defined as the coun­tries belong­ing to the Inter-Gov­ern­men­tal Author­i­ty for Devel­op­ment (IGAD) – Dji­bouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Soma­lia, Sudan, South Sudan and Ugan­da.

Coun­cil of the Euro­pean Union

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