The terror strike on an Israeli diplomat brought the Iran-Israel shadow war to the streets of Delhi. Any crisis in the Persian Gulf would dramatically escalate the price of oil and thereby seriously impact on the Indian and global economy. The price of oil could easily cross US$ 200 per barrel and more. Over 68 per cent of India’s oil supplies and 100 per cent of its gas are currently sourced from the Gulf region. The US and Europe are now putting in place economic sanctions to target Iran’s oil exports. Iran in turn has threatened to block the Straits of Hormuz in retaliation. Any Iranian attempts to close the Gulf of Hormuz could seriously impact the Chinese, Indian, Japanese and South Korean economies. Such an economic crisis would be pushing the envelope too far and there is now a need for a frank dialogue between us and our strategic partners. This article analyses the likely shape and contours of an Israeli military strike on Iran and its huge consequences. A clear and present danger is looming and there is a dire need to anticipate events and defuse the crisis before it overtakes us.

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There is a looming crisis gathering over the Persian Gulf. Israel is getting restive over the Iranian quest for a nuclear weapons capability and is seemingly preparing for a military strike to knock out the Iranian nuclear facilities. This shadow war between Iran and Israel reached New Delhi with the terror attack on the Israeli diplomat within earshot of the Prime Ministers residence at 7 Race Course Road. Far more critical than this terror escalation however, is the prospect of a conventional conflict between Iran and Israel and the disastrous impact it could have on our energy security. With the recently concluded war in Iraq and the still ongoing engagement in Afghanistan, the US has apparently little appetite for another war in the Persian Gulf so soon - especially one that could spin out of control. In 2007-08 the US had made naval show of force deployments in the Persian Gulf to coerce Iran into calling off its nuclear programme. US air strikes then would certainly have put back the Iranian nuclear programme by a few years.

However, the fear of Iranian retaliation, primarily through means of asymmetric warfare options and its capability to target shipping / oil lanes in the Gulf, threatened to entrain an escalator where the endgame would have become highly risky. It could have derailed the global economy and generated a worldwide recession with the price of oil soaring beyond the US$ 200 a barrel mark. So America had clearly backed off then.

The US intelligence estimates stated thereafter that Iran had halted its drive for nuclear weaponisation. The world had heaved a sigh of relief and there was a visible deescalation in the strident rhetoric for then. There are however some indications of a change in the scenario once again. When the military option was taken off the table in 2007, the Israeli intelligence was given a free hand and virtually unlimited funds to target the Iranian nuclear programme and scientists. Meir Dagan, the head of the Mossad was given a three years extension to hit the Iranian programme. So far five very senior Iranian nuclear scientists have been assassinated alongwith the head of the Iranian missile programme. The Stuxnet virus was used to infect the Iranian Uranium enrichment facility and serious acts of sabotage hit the Iranian missile production programme. Meanwhile in Sepember 2007 itself the Israeli Air Force had struck the Syrian nuclear facility at Al Kabir and destroyed it successfully.


When the military option was taken off the table in 2007, the Israeli intelligence was given a free hand and virtually unlimited funds to target the Iranian nuclear programme and scientists. So far six very senior Iranian nuclear scientists have been assassinated. The Stuxnet virus was used to infect the Iranian Uranium enrichment facility and serious acts of sabotage hit the Iranian missile production programme


Israeli rehearsals

In June 2008 Israel had carried out a major military exercise, which appeared to be a full dress rehearsal for a potential bombing attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. US officials then said that the Israeli exercise appeared to be an effort to develop the country’s long range strike potential and demonstrate the seriousness with which it views Iran’s nuclear programme. Was it another coercive exercise to deter Iran or a full fledged rehearsal for an impending Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities?

Media reports speculated that over a 100 Israeli F-15 and F-16 aircraft had taken part in these manoeuvres over the Eastern Mediterranean over Greece and Crete. The exercise also included Israeli helicopters that could be used to rescue downed pilots. The helicopters and refuelling tankers flew over 900 miles – the approximate distance between Israel and nuclear target sets in Iran.

This article is published with the kind permission of "Defence and Security Alert (DSA) Magazine" New Delhi-India

But such an economic crisis would be pushing the envelope too far and there is now a need for a frank dialogue between us and our strategic partners. While our strategic partners expect us to buy their civil and military aircraft to bail out their economies, they cannot create a situation which could seriously derail the Indian economy. There are vital national stakes involved and we must articulate them to our friends who have to show some understanding. Particularly important at this juncture is the fate of Afghanistan post the US withdrawal and India would need Iran for access to Afghanistan and the Central Asian landmass.


In Athens, an official of the Greek Air Force Central Command, had confirmed, that it had taken part in a joint training exercise with Israel off the Mediterranean island of Crete. Named Glorious Spartan 08, these exercises, were actually conducted from May 28 to June 12, 2008. It was a highly visible and coercive exercise intended to demonstrate Israel’s serious concern over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In fact, on June 6, Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister, Shaul Mofaz, had warned that Iran would face attacks if it pursues what he said was its nuclear weapons programme. The Mossad Director Meir Dagan got an extension till 2010 which was being linked to Israel’s likely plans for a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Sabotage attempts have clearly slowed down the Iranian nuclear programme. However they have also served to highten Iran’s deep sense of insecurity which would impel it to move faster on its nuclear weapons programme. The US and its European allies are now going ahead with their plans to impose severe economic sanctions on Iran that target its petroleum exports and could derail its economy. Iran has threatened that in such a strangulation scenario it would close the straits of Hormuz and trigger a global economic recession. The economies worst hit would be those of China, India, Japan and South Korea. India is close to losing some US$ 40 billion of export revenues because the Reliance facility at Jamnagar has been prevented from refining Iranian crude oil due to its linkages with the American banking system. It is noteworthy that India imports of oil were some 21.2 mn tons some two years ago. These are still at 13 mt. Any closure of the Gulf of Hormuz could trigger an energy crisis as over 68 per cent of India’s oil imports come from the Persian Gulf countries. The price of oil could easily cross over US$ 200 per barrel and trigger a serious economic crisis not just in Asia but all over the globe. However, our strategic partners seem least concerned about the potential damage to the Indian economy. Apparently their national security interests are supreme and they couldn’t care less about ours. We are supposed to tamely subordinate our national interests to their security concerns. So far India has gone along with the security concerns of its strategic partners but such an economic crisis would be pushing the envelope too far and there is now a need for a frank dialogue between us and our strategic partners. While our strategic partners expect us to buy their civil and military aircraft to bail out their economies, they cannot create a situation which could seriously derail the Indian economy. There are vital national stakes involved and we must articulate them to our friends who have to show some understanding. Particularly important at this juncture is the fate of Afghanistan post the US withdrawal and India would need Iran for access to Afghanistan and the Central Asian landmass. We cannot accept a situation where the crumbling state of Pakistan is appointed as the colonising power for Afghanistan. At the same time however, the Israelis have been our trusted strategic partners and our second largest source of military equipment and supplies, especially of critical high-tech equipment which the Americans are not prepared to give us directly. We also need American support to counterbalance the rising power of China. Hence the situation is achieving critical mass and requires some very clear-headed thinking and articulation of vital national interests that cannot be compromised. This is the time for hectic parleys and dialogue before the situation spins out of control.

We cannot accept a situation where the crumbling state of Pakistan is appointed as the colonising power for Afghanistan. At the same time however, the Israelis have been our trusted strategic partners and our second largest source of military equipment and supplies, especially of critical high-tech equipment which the Americans are not prepared to give us directly. We also need American support to counterbalance the rising power of China. Hence the situation is achieving critical mass and requires some very clear-headed thinking and articulation of vital national interests that cannot be compromised


The Israelis have said that they have only 9 months to stop Iran from achieving nuclear capability. The Americans they feel have only 15 months (with their superior resources) to do so before the window of opportunity closes finally. The US intelligence sources however feel the Iranians are still some three years away from nuclear capability (courtesy the covert offensive). They are nervous over Iranian plans to retaliate in kind - with covert asymmetric options on US soil. They have asked Israel to give them at least 10 days notice in case they plan to take out the nascent Iranian capabilities through Air strikes. A dangerous situation is developing. America has totally eliminated its dependence on Saudi and Gulf oil. Europe is about to curtail its dependence on Iranian oil courtesy the oil resources of Libiya and Iraq. We import 12 per cent of our oil needs from Iran and 22 per cent from Saudi Arabia. Our energy security reliance on Saudi Arabia is growing by leaps and bounds. The close ties between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan make it a worrying scenario in case of any conflict triggered by terrorist strikes or otherwise in South Asia. What if a panicked Iran closes the Gulf of Hormuz in retaliation for the economic sanctions? What would be the impact on our energy security? How long would such a closure last? What would be the impact on oil and gas prices? What is the state of our Strategic petroleum reserve?


Our energy security reliance on Saudi Arabia is growing by leaps and bounds. The close ties between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan make it a worrying scenario in case of any conflict triggered by terrorist strikes or otherwise in South Asia. What if a panicked Iran closes the Gulf of Hormuz in retaliation for the economic sanctions? What would be the impact on our energy security? How long would such a closure last? What would be the impact on oil and gas prices? What is the state of our Strategic petroleum reserve?


This article will steer clear of value judgments on the proliferation issues involved and focus on a purely military net assessment of likely conflict scenarios that could emerge in the Gulf in case of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

This article will employ the technique of pattern modelling to discern the shape and basic contours of an Israeli air attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. Towards this end it will:

• Study the Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor.
• Speculate upon the likely details of an Israeli air strike option on Iranian nuclear facilities.
• Briefly examine Iranian response options .
• Examine the impact on India of such a hypothetical conflict scenario in the Gulf.

Osirak redux

In a very meticulous paper entitled “Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities”, Whitney Raas and Austin Lang (International Security Vol No 31. Spring 2007), had carried out an excellent analysis of Israel’s raid on the Iraqi Osirak Reactor of June 7, 1981.They had gone on to outline an equally credible net assessment of an Israeli directed strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. The paper is insightful and revealing and merits study in detail.

On June 7, 1981, Israel had launched one of the most ambitious preventive attacks in history. Israel’s Mossad had sought to buy time by allegedly sabotaging the reactor cores before the French companies could supply them to Iraq and assassinated some key Iraqi nuclear officials. In October 1980, Mossad reported to the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin that Osirak Reactor would be operational by June 1981. There was intense debate in the Israeli Government before the final clearance was given.

The Israeli Air Force employed a strike package of 16 aircraft (8 x F-15s and 8 x F-16s). These took off from Etzion air base in the Sinai desert. Their flight profiles were low altitude across the Gulf of Aquaba, southern Jordan and then across northern Saudi Arabia to the target. The F-16s carried 2 x MK-84, 2,000 Ib bombs each with delayed action fuzes. Though these were dumb gravity bombs, the F-16 aircraft did have onboard targeting computer systems that could make their delivery fairly accurate. However, such accuracy was required that the planes get close to the target. The strike package arrived near the Osirak reactor completely undetected. The F-15s then climbed up to establish a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) to intercept any Iraqi fighters that would attempt to challenge the mission.

The F-16s formed up at predetermined points to begin their bombing runs. About four miles from the target, the F-16s climbed to 5,000 feet to dive at Osirak and release their bomb loads. Despite some navigation problems and Iraqi air defences, at least 8 of the 16 bombs struck the containment dome of the reactor. The strike package then turned and climbed to high altitude and returned to base along much the same route it had adopted for entry. All the 16 aircraft returned safely to base. The results were spectacular. Bomb damage assessment showed that the Iraqi reactor was totally destroyed.

Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities: Target analysis

Iranian target sets

The Rass and Lang paper stated that Iran has obviously learnt the lessons of the Osirak raid. Its nuclear facilities are widely dispersed. The paper asserts that Iran is pursuing multiple pathways to nuclear weapons capability to include Uranium enrichment and Plutonium production concurrently. The Uranium enrichment pathway, it avers, is significantly more advanced than the Plutonium production route presently.

As such, the paper identifies the following Iranian target sets (the three critical Iranian nodes for the production of fissile material):

• Isfahan. Uranium conversion facility at Isfahan.
• Natanz. The large Uranium enrichment facility at Natanz.
• Arak. Heavy water (HW) plant and plutonium production reactors under construction at Arak.
• Bushehr. The paper analyses the projected plans for construction of the light water reactor with Russian aid at Bushehr. However, it feels that this is not a hardened site and being on the coast, could be better struck by submarine launched cruise missiles. A detailed analysis of the three earlier target sets would now be essential.
• Fordo. The facility that the Rass and Lang paper did not factor in was the newly unveiled underground storage facility at Fordo, near the holy city of Qom where substantial amounts of low grade and middle grade Iranian fissile material is stored in a deep underground facility some 220 ft deep underground (and as such beyond the capabilities of most bunker busting bombs). It is noteworthy that Iran has five tons of low grade enriched Uranium which could be used to make some 5-6 bombs. It has also stockpiled 175 lbs of medium grade fissile material. Israel claims Iranian scientists could make a bomb within 9 months of the decision to do so and may need another 6 months to reduce its size to fit the Shabab missiles.

Isfahan: Iran’s nuclear conversion facility at Isfahan is the primary chemical facility for Iran’s nuclear programme. This facility produces Uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the feed gas for uranium centrifuges, Uranium dioxide (UO2) for reactor fuel and Uranium metal. Destruction of this facility could result in significant production of hydrofluoric acid which is a highly corrosive chemical. Major risks of collateral damage would be inherent, as this facility is located fairly close to the major population centre of Isfahan. The destruction of this facility would interrupt the production of UF6 feed gas for enrichment at Natanz as well as production of UO2 fuel for future heavy water reactors at Arak.


The Deep Command was specifically established with potential conflicts in distant theatres like Iran in mind. This previously was solely the responsibility of the IAF. The Raas and Lang Paper feels that Israeli Special Forces employment will only be confined to vectoring in the air strikes with laser designators and carrying out immediate bomb damage assessment. In fact, the paper has identified the Sayeret-Shaldag Unit 5101 of the IAF, which specialises in laser designation and Unit 5707, which specialises in real time bomb damage assessment, for this task

Natanz: The Natanz facility is the next critical link. This site is 200 miles south of Tehran and 40 miles from the nearest city. It comprises a pilot fuel enrichment plant and, as the paper asserts, a much larger commercial plant underground which is awaiting arrival of thousands of centrifuges. As such the optimal time for the strike would be once the centrifuges are installed but before a large quantity of UF6 has been introduced. Bombing the empty hall prior to centrifuge installation would be futile in terms of an anti-proliferation strike. The installation of centrifuges and their operation has been delayed by sabotage (Stutnext virus and faulty parts).

Arak: The HW plant and plutonium production reactor at Arak constitute a very large facility, located some 150 miles south-west of Tehran. The site itself is some 20 miles from the nearest town. The paper claims that Iran has a small research reactor that uses HW as coolant, but the Arak HW facility, will be able to produce more than 16 tons of HW per year – a capability, that is far in excess of the civilian requirements. The two Arak reactors are scheduled for completion by 2014 and they could produce weapons grade Plutonium.

Israeli strike options

Having defined the Iranian target sets, we need to examine in comprehensive detail, the Israeli strike options. The capabilities of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) are far more advanced today (in terms of enhanced accuracy and ability to penetrate hardened targets such as reactor containment) than they were in 1981 at the time of the Osirak raid. Acquisition of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) in 1980s and 1990s, means that the dynamics of IAF bombing have been transformed. The Lo-Lo-High mission profile would now be redundant. Accurate delivery would no longer require approach at low altitudes and then popping up to dive directly on target.

The Israeli strike package would now come at mid or high altitude, navigate accurately due to GPS and attack the target with laser guided bombs (LGBs) or GPS guided munitions from standoff ranges of at least 15 kms or more. CEP at the time of the Osirak raid was of the order of 8-12 metres (due to computerised aiming system of the F-16). GPS guided munitions can achieve the same accuracy today from a 15 km standoff range and high altitude delivery. Laser guided bombs could give a CEP of about 3 meters from the same stand off range.

Target penetration levels have also been greatly enhanced with the use of “bunker busters” or penetrating warheads with delayed action fuzes. These are delivered from high altitudes at steep angles and can penetrate tens of feet of earth and even several feet of reinforced concrete.

Possible options in the Israeli inventory are:

• PB 500 AI A 1,000 lb class penetrating bomb
• BLU-109 A 2,000 lb class penetrating war head
• BLU-113 A 5,000

Accuracy could be further enhanced by laser designation of the targets by Israeli Special Forces (SF). The article cites Maj Gen Etyan Ben Elyahu (former Commander of IAF who took part in Osirak raid) as saying that even if one BLU-113 did not penetrate the earth and concrete at Natanz, two successive strikes could do so. A combined blast of three BLU -113s he felt, could destroy the Natanz facilities. For complete assurance levels, a combination of BLU-113s and BLU-109s may be required. The other two target sets at Isfahan and Arak are not hardened as of now and would be relatively easier to tackle. These may well be targeted by the smaller BLU-109 warheads.


It would be therefore very much in India’s interests, as also in the regional and global interests to ensure a peaceful, negotiated resolution to this crisis. It would be prudent however, to make contingency plans for the worst case scenarios that may entail a diversification of our oil and gas import sources and possibly a large scale evacuation of the Indian emigrant population from the Gulf region. The base line assumption would proceed from the likely duration of the conflict and disruption of the oil supplies. The long-term spectre of a series of failed states in Asia is chilling


Strike modalities

The Israeli strike at PLO headquarters at Tunis in 1985 amply demonstrated Israeli deep strike capabilities upto a range of almost 4,000 kms. Today these capabilities remain centered on the F-15s and F-16s. The IAF now has 25 x F-15 I Raas and 25 or more F-16 I Soufa aircraft which have been specially configured for deep strike. Both these planes have an unrefuelled combat radius of 1,700 kms with external drop tanks. The F-16 I could deliver 2 x 2,000 lb bombs while carrying external fuel tanks. Both types of aircraft have advanced ECM suites and remain capable of air–to–air combat. Whitney Raas and Austin Lang have envisioned a 50 strong strike package of 25 x F-15 Is and 25 x F-16 Is.

This package would be divided into three smaller strike packages (one for each facility) Any larger strike package than this would strain Israeli refuelling capabilities.

The paper has considered three routing options as under:

• Northern Route: Fly North to the Mediterranean sea, refuel ex airborne tankers, fly East over Turkey to strike Iran. Total route length 2,220 kms approx.
• Osirak Route: Fly South-east, skirt Jordan and Saudi Arabia, fly North-east over Iraq (with mid-air refuelling) and into Iran. This would largely be the Osirak route. Total length 2,160 kms.
• Southern Route: Fly South-east, then East along Saudi–Iraqi border to the Persian Gulf, refuel either over Saudi territory or the Gulf and on to Iran. At 2,410 kms, this is the longest routing option and would entail refuelling twice, both on the way out and in.

Refuelling Capacity: Israel has a fleet of 4 to 5 KC-130s and 5 to 7 KC-707s. For a strike package of 50 aircraft, the KC-707 fleet could deliver 12 to 16,000 lbs at a distance of 1,000 NM. All the three routing options would need refuelling twice, especially, if air–to–air combat takes place short of or over the target.

Analysis

The paper is silent about the aspect of reduction in range if the F-16 Is carry the 5,000 lbs BLU-113 warheads. Presumably, air–to–air refuelling on both the route in and route out of the flight path could overcome this constraint. However, the transit of such a huge strike package over the territories of Jordan, Saudi Arabia or Turkey is a major grey area that almost rules out these routing options. All that is left is the classical Osirak route over Iraq. The paper has also not gone into details of the suppression defences, the electronic suppression measures and whether a Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW or AWAC) would be needed to control the air-to-air battle that is bound to result as the strike packages penetrate Iranian airspace. Also these calculations are silent about the Fordo facility near Qom.

Employment of special forces

After the experience gained in trying to co-ordinate the three wings of the Israeli Special Forces (Sayeret Matkal of the Israeli Intelligence, Shaldag of the IAF and Sahyetet 13 Commandoes of the Israeli Navy) during the 2006 conflict in Lebanon, the Israelis have now set up the Special Forces Command or the “Deep Command”. This is now responsible for commanding and co-ordinating all operations beyond Territorial Command Theatres. It is headed by Brig Gen Tal Russo, a veteran Special Forces officer and is now the Israeli Defence Forces Eighth HQ authorised to operate forces – the other being Air HQ, Naval HQ, Northern, Central, Southern and Home Front Commands as also the AMAN or Israeli Intelligence.

The Deep Command was specifically established with potential conflicts in distant theatres like Iran in mind. This previously was solely the responsibility of the IAF. The Raas and Lang Paper feels that Israeli Special Forces employment will only be confined to vectoring in the air strikes with laser designators and carrying out immediate bomb damage assessment. In fact, the paper has identified the Sayeret-Shaldag Unit 5101 of the IAF, which specialises in laser designation and Unit 5707, which specialises in real time bomb damage assessment, for this task. Post the war in Lebanon, the IAF primacy in matters military is being challenged by a new generation of Israeli Army Generals led by the new Chief of the General Staff Lt Gen Gabi Ashkenazi.

The Chinese may view this assault on Iran as a direct attempt to hit their economy. (China imports 22 per cent of its oil from Iran, Japan 14 per cent, India 12 per cent and South Korea 10 per cent) Are economic sanctions on Iran’s Oil exports meant to hit the Chinese economy? It also has the unintended (or intended?) serious consequences for the Indian economy which India can ill afford to ignore or take lightly


The Special Forces and Israeli Intelligence are also likely to play a more prominent role. Though destruction of the nuclear facilities may entirely be left to the IAF, Special Forces are likely to play a role in the neutralisation / elimination of key radars or command and control facilities for air defence, as Israel lacks stealth aircraft capability to take on these. Air penetration corridors may have to be cleared by Special Forces action.

However, large scale employment of Special Forces may not be likely, given the widespread nature and distance of the targets and the sheer complexity of operations involved. After all, the US Delta Force’s botched attempt to rescue hostages in Iran is not a reassuring precedent. It would all be a function of the quantum and quality of human intelligence assets available to Israel within Iran itself and the degree to which Iran’s air defences could be physically / electronically suppressed.

In sum, Israeli air attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities will be a very mammoth and extremely complex operation with huge in-built risks and serious potential for uncontrolled escalation and widening of the conflict. These constraints by themselves lessen the chances of the adoption of this option but cannot be ruled out altogether.

Given the operational and political complexities and also the uncertainties in execution and outcome, this option will be difficult, but not beyond the capabilities of the IAF. The problem area would be in dealing with the likely Iranian conventional and asymmetric responses.

Iranian response options

Briefly, Iranian response options could be analysed under two heads:

Conventional

Air defence: Iranian fighters are a mix of vintage US aircraft like the Phantoms and F-5s as also Russian Su-22, Su-24 fighters and 40 x Mig-29s. Since, these would be operating close to their bases they would have an advantage. Hawk SAMs would pose a threat to Israeli strike packages. There are reports of Iran having Russian SA-10 and SA-15 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). However, radar cover and command and control are weak links.

Iran’s missile capabilities: Iran could hit targets in Israel, the Gulf countries, Middle East and even Southern Europe. Its missile inventory comprises:

• Shabab I: Maximum range 205 miles (330 kms)
• Shahab II: Maximum range 435 miles (700 kms)
• Shabab III: Maximum range 840 miles (1,350 kms). This puts Israel and the fringes of Europe in range. Israel and the Middle eastern Sunni states are likely to be hit by a barrge of conventional tipped missiles.

Oil tanker war II: Iran could blockade the Gulf of Hormuz. It could mine sea lanes and attack oil tankers with surface-to-surface missiles. Some 300 mines would be sufficient to close the narrow strait. Iran has some 2,000 mines. This could seriously disrupt global oil supplies and push oil prices to beyond US$ 200 a barrel. India would be particularly affected. Iranian high speed boats could launch massed swarming attacks on US warships in the closed waters of the Gulf and cause the loss of major capital ships. Iranian Kilo submarines are also a significant threat as are its Midget submarines

Asymmetric options

• Hezbollah could open a front against Israel via Lebanon with help from Iranian Special Forces. Hezbollah has some 50,000 rockets in its armoury and could strike civilian targets all over Israel.
• Palestinian organisations could be assisted by Iran’s Special Forces (Al Quds detachments).
• Iranian Special Forces could strike targets in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, as also assist the Taliban in Afghanistan. Hezbollah and Hamas could strike targets in Israel and other Middle Eastern states. All this could create a global economic crisis with the worst fallout on China, India, Japan and South Korea, the key consumers of Iran’s energy exports.

Implications for India

India is close to losing some US$ 40 billion of revenue from refining the Iranian crude at the Reliance Jamnagar refinery. Any crisis in the Persian Gulf would lead to the need to evacuate some 6 million Indian expatriates now working in the Gulf. They send home remittances worth US$ 40 billion every year. Besides a Gulf crisis could dramatically escalate the price of oil and thereby seriously impact on the Indian and global economy. The price of oil could easily cross a US$ 200 per barrel and more. Over 68 per cent of India’s oil supplies and 100 per cent of its gas are currently sourced from the Gulf region. This dependence on Persian Gulf oil and gas is largely a function of geography, spatial distance / linkages and transportation costs. Keeping in view the extreme volatility in this region, it would be prudent for India to try and diversify its sources of energy imports and possibly try to get more oil and gas from Africa, Russia and Central Asia and even Brazil and Venezuela. However this cannot be done in a short time frame as most Indian refineries are geared to deal only with Iranian crude.

Israeli or US attacks could cause Iran to make expedient tactical shifts and provide support to Taliban and Al Qaeda elements in Afghanistan. Its support to the Taliban could have a very destabilising impact on Afghanistan and by extension in Jammu and Kashmir and the rest of India. In a post US withdrawal scenario from Afghanistan India would need Iran to gain access to Afghanistan. Hence India would need to keep its channels of communication open with Iran.


Conflict however may be instigated in this case by the Israelis. A pattern analysis of Israeli decision making before the Osirak raid reveals many patterns that are repeating themselves. Isreali former Intelligence Chief Meir Dagan has stridently expressed himself against any conventional attack on Iran. However the Israeli PM and Defence Minister are worried that time is fast running out and may well decide to strike


It may have to expedite the consolidation of its strategic petroleum reserves. Gas is going to be the primary energy source of the 21st century and our energy dependence on gas is likely to grow by leaps and bounds. India’s attempts to secure supplies of Iranian gas reserves over land routes / pipelines may need to be expedited, because of the likelihood of disruption of supplies routed through the sea. Passage through Pakistan however is another question mark. Iran and India had earlier closed ranks to support the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan against the Taliban-Al Qaeda combine.

It would be therefore very much in India’s interests, as also in the regional and global interests to ensure a peaceful, n e g o t i a t e d resolution to this crisis. It would be prudent however, to make contingency plans for the worst case scenarios that may entail a diversification of our oil and gas import sources and possibly a large scale evacuation of the Indian emigrant population from the Gulf region. The base line assumption would proceed from the likely duration of the conflict and disruption of the oil supplies. The long-term spectre of a series of failed states in Asia is chilling. It would give a major boost to the forces of destabilisation and chaos and encourage non-state actors to flourish in such shatter zones of collapse. Inconclusive conventional conflicts in the Gulf could lead to the chilling prospect of the “Somalisation” of this region. This prospect is daunting both at the regional and global level and could have a paradoxical impact – that the very quest for enhanced security, leads to greater destabilisation, chaos and instability.

While air strikes on Iranian nuclear / missile complexes might neutralise assumed conventional or WMD threats, these may end up creating an entire new series of asymmetric threats. In purely military terms, the outcome of this conflict would be critical for the Chinese, as it would enable them to evaluate the impact of massed ballistic / cruise missile strikes on US naval surface combatants, especially high value targets like aircraft carriers and also the efficacy of the Kilo submarines – both, key ingredients of their access denial strategy to prevent US intervention in any hypothetical crisis in the Taiwan Straits. The Chinese may view this assault on Iran as a direct attempt to hit their economy. (China imports 22 per cent of its oil from Iran, Japan 14 per cent, India 12 per cent and South Korea 10 per cent). Are economic sanctions on Iran’s oil exports meant to hit the Chinese economy? It also has the unintended (or intended?) serious consequences for the Indian economy which India can ill afford to ignore or take lightly.

The Iraq and Afghan experience has certainly drained American political will to engage militarily overseas. Conflict however may be instigated in this case by the Israelis. A pattern analysis of Israeli decision making before the Osirak raid reveals many patterns that are repeating themselves. Isreali former Intelligence Chief Meir Dagan has stridently expressed himself against any conventional attack on Iran. However the Israeli PM and Defence Minister are worried that time is fast running out and may well decide to strike. Chinese reliance on energy supplies from the Gulf is very high and, as such, the impact on the Chinese economy would also be highly adverse. So would it be for the Indian, Japanese and South Korean economies. The most likely outcome of crisis in the Gulf would be a full fledged global economic recession.


About the Author
Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) - The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the highly prestigious Directorate General of Military Operations. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is also Executive Editor of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.

Note by the Author:
Iran has threatened that in such a strangulation scenario it would close the straits of Hormuz and trigger a global economic recession. The economies worst hit would be those of China, India, Japan and South Korea. Over the last two years India has already lost some US$ 40 billion of export revenues because the Reliance facility at Jamnagar has been prevented from refining Iranian crude oil. It is noteworthy that India imports of oil were some 21.2 mn tons some two years ago. These are still at 13 mt. Any closure of the Gulf of Hormuz could trigger an energy crisis as over 68 per cent of India’s oil imports come from the Persian Gulf countries. The price of oil could easily cross over US$ 200 per barrel and trigger a serious economic crisis not just in Asia but all over the globe


Defence and Security Alert (DSA
Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine is the only ISO 9001:2008 certified, premier world class, new wave monthly magazine which features paradigm changing in-depth analyses on defence, security, safety and surveillance, focusing on developing and strategic future scenarios in India and around the world.